X: MANY SURROUNDING WORLDS AND THE ONE TRUE WORLD: THE RELATIVITY OF THE LIFE-WORLDLY TRUTH AND THE BEING-IN-ITSELF OF THE WORLD

No. 59

Basic investigations in order to clarify the ideas “surrounding world” and “true world”. And from there clarifying the personalistic attitude[[1]](#footnote-1)

<§ 1. Accordance, discordancy and amendment of the discordancy within a single subjective and intersubjective experiential connection of a world being relative therefore>

“Surrounding world” usually is a relative expression. But it designates something essential in its universality: a system of essential structures to be brought out which *a priori* belong to a surrounding world as such.

If we take as a starting point that the world we experience singly and within communication, which we consequently consider and with which we occupy ourselves in different ways of intentionality, is experienced in different subjective modes, and that everyone thus has his apperceptions together with his acceptances of being. **Everyone has** – we then do not say without any unclarity – **his picture of the world**, and many subjects together possibly have a common picture of the world; or else: They have different [pictures of the world], whereas they communicate within a common one; and this implies that **they know themselves to be related to the same world**, that they apprehend each other as experiencing the same world, but in detail experiencing in different ways, **[674]** in other points [experiencing] in an according way. If there is complete accordance then again it is not excluded that within the process of common experience again discrepancies emerge.

<1)> Thus already for the **single subject**. He experiences the world in his respective world apperception, comprising manifold single experiences with single experienced objectivities. Within the process of experience – and in advance we can only have in mind the process here, even when talking of our present world apprehension – continuous accordance may govern and then we have a homogenous certainty of the world, as far as it “falls into our apprehension”. But in detail still discordancies can emerge while the certainty of the being of the world like [it has been] in advance still remains unbroken. Then it is simply doubtful what the world is like with regard to the respective details, or else it becomes certain that it is not that way in this point as we thought (that there had been an illusion here), and that it therefore is different itself. Thus the change into accordance and discordancy can happen occasionally and de facto happens often enough. Always then the world, as we righteously say, is experienced in different, now according, now discordant ways. But if we prefer the according ways then each according continuity of the complete experience forms an according surrounding world, although a temporally according one, one being purely and simply within the certainty of being for us; and it then still has a change in its process in that the same [surrounding world] being for us shows itself to us now from these, now from those sides, and thereby now in these, now in those other subjective modes (ways of appearance). Within the change in accordance “the” world enters our experience with ever new shapes and determines itself experientially in an ever richer way. But this world being within accordance, “of” which something that different comes into appearance, however it on the one hand contrasts against the changes of appearance and of other modalizing, and on the other hand against the changes of the ways of appearance within the accordance, is as a world itself again only a **surrounding world and relative**.

<2)> Not only **for me** can the world being accepted as the world itself experience its ruptures in new sections of the world experience **[675]** and thereby changes into non-being, whereas the new world itself again is relative and at the same time both have the “true” world behind themselves, the one “presenting itself” constantly through all change of this kind within these world appearances, accordant and discordant ones, **the play repeats itself within communication**. My world as such, being already experienced accordingly in itself and being certain for me purely and simply, and likewise such a <world> of the other ones come into conflict; that which is right within single subjective experience is not right any more within intersubjective [experience]. And again the intersubjective discordancy does not disturb the conviction of “the” world, of the true one, concerning which we are just not in accordance, which then simply shows itself to us generally in different ways of appearance and continuities of appearance in an intersubjectively changing way, but also in such [ways of appearance and continuities of appearance] that they do not coincide within an intersubjective according synthesis of all these single subjective syntheses. But if they do like in everyday life, when our world is a well according experiential world, then this world is again relative, a **world on dismissal**, a mere appearance which is always an appearance of the world the being of which as a lasting conviction is not to be doubted.

Accordingly we can say: **Surrounding world** for a respective subjectivity, a single- or collective human [subjectivity](in most different collectivities), is a <world> then experienced as harmoniously being accepted and from harmonious experience in simple certainty continuously being accepted for the time being, with its determined sense content and with open horizons to which the presumption of a prospective, but quite certain process of experience in the sense of harmony and of the corresponding closer determination of the “being” surrounding world belongs.

If we freely vary the surrounding world, if we conceive of quite random surrounding worlds within a pure generality then we grasp the essential structure of a surrounding world as such.[[2]](#footnote-2) If we register that each surrounding world shall be a subjective presentation of an “objectively true” world as of one and the same for “everyone”, then the “**everyone**”, in which an open multiplicity of personal subjects is already presupposed, and the **manifold surrounding worlds** belong together; and it belongs to the essence of these surrounding worlds, that they at least within **[676]** their horizon’s sense at the same time contain the persons as surrounding world objects. Simply thereby it is said though that it is a part of each surrounding world’s essence that as determinational piece of the persons and of their intentional life it also contains their surrounding worlds, for which then the same must hold true.

But surrounding world is not only to be grasped as **harmonious** surrounding world although it plays this role of preference. Each person consistently has his harmonious experience, harmonious insofar as the creation of a harmony after the breaking of a disharmony lies within the horizon of certainty. The momentary surrounding world may be inconsistent, but it is only a piece of an experiential continuity with a preceding harmony which has transitioned into a discrepancy. Discrepancy necessarily presupposes a preceding harmony. But the actually experienced world is a world as that which **needs to be corrected**, although it still is a mere appearance after correction, leaving open possibilities of new discrepancy, single-subjective and intersubjective [discrepancy], that is, always carrying along the presumptive truth in itself as presumption. Discrepancy in the structure of this surrounding world always means a struggle against a universal harmony, connecting past and present experience and remaining accepted, which simply has a gap of harmony within the interfering subject being able to be closed within presumptive certainty. These gaps are subjective characters of the appearing and valid world which is itself subjective, simply as accepted appearance which has to always put back its true in-itself. All that belongs to the essential content of a surrounding world. But that which belongs to the essential content of a surrounding world as such, also belongs to the essential content of the world itself, that which is pre-given as truthfully being, and always in advance being a matter of course. But how may this be understood? **[677]**

<§2. The structure of the form of a surrounding world as such as presupposition for the possibility of a synthesis of different surrounding worlds towards a true world. The interpenetration of the apriori of world as such and of personality as such>

We need to distinguish: 1) The **universally essential**, which all surrounding worlds as such have in common, the identical of the comparing and the variation; 2) the **identical of the synthesis**, the synthetically agreeing of different surrounding worlds as appearances of the same true or relatively true [surrounding world]. Each surrounding world within a multiplicity of surrounding worlds of the **same** world must have a form structure enabling a congruence with any other one in the sense of the congruence of different appearances of **the same**:

**True world**, **appearing** to me, which I experience in a subjective way belonging to the surrounding world, or rather, which I have been given already ideally as being thus and thus experienced up till now and presumptively *in infinitum* to be continuously experienced in harmony, is **the index for a multiplicity of one’s own and foreign surrounding worlds which need to be connected synthetically**, that is, under the idea of an “endless” experience, in which they are to studied as relatively true ones of single or all subjects.[[3]](#footnote-3)

If I go over to full eidetic universality (in which I actually already am), then to each possible de facto subjectivity (whole subjectivity) such a multiplicity of surrounding worlds belongs, related to the world presumptively given by them as true, but only experienced as surrounding world. It then can be seen that all such multiplicities of the surrounding world, although belonging to different possible worlds and being incompatible with each other, have to coincide synthetically in their **structure of form** and that this structure of form then has to belong to each of the true worlds in the same way, that it thus must be the **structure of the form of [678] each** **possible being world pure and simple**, according to the current point of view: the formal structure of the true world and of each possible true world as being in harmony conceivable into infinity.[[4]](#footnote-4) Since if the natural attitude in which in advance a world is in itself (presupposedly and as an unseen matter of course) and if the persons are thematic as belonging to it, as purely and simply being, then not only all surrounding worlds are subjective appearances of the world, but also their **syntheses** are **subjective** and finally **the idea of an into infinity to be brought out** (referringly co-correcting) **accordance** of actual and possible experiences, that is, of all surrounding worlds. Thus even this synthetic idea is that of something personal subjective and thereby [it is] the piece of equipment of the personal content of the actual world (eidetically: of a world conceived of as actually presupposed).

Yet it needs to be heeded that the possible synthesis of surrounding worlds has its apriori, even if we only find this as belonging to the essence of each possible surrounding world of one and the same personality, that it must come to a synthetic unity with every other [group], and every other group with each other. The possibility of the synthesis presupposes a structure of the form, which simply comes to the fore with random **[679]** variation of the surrounding world. But certainly also the idea of continuation into an accordance *in infinitum* belongs to each surrounding world.

Our attitude: a world. This world is pregiven as being a matter of course, as a universe of determinable true beings.

We straightforwardly make the community of persons a theme, which is the subject of the intentionality, related to its surrounding world, i.e. to the world, the way it respectively “appears” to it [the community of persons]. Also the conviction related to the world (temporarily being experienced in a univocal way, temporarily being experienced in a discordant way) belongs to the personal field, that a relative truth is implied in it – relative insofar as it is “the” world the way I currently grasp it - <and> that this conception in its actual and possible change gave room to differences of accuracy and inaccuracy, and else of perfection and imperfection. It also belongs to the conception of this world that it is an **intersubjective world**, presenting itself in its ways to other subjects and ever again presenting itself within the synthesis of these different surrounding worlds – always with the open possibility of inaccuracies, which still do not destroy the whole of the conception, but still allow it to remain in the state of an appearance of “the” world. Each correction is a substitute for something inaccurate by way of something re-producing the universal harmony of my or our experience, and yet is only relative, leaving again open a room for possible inaccuracy, and anyway also for perfectionings of the closer determination within the personal field, within the interpersonal field of the surrounding world. **All conceivable opinions, all conceivable cognitions, values, actions are implied within the universal personal field**, for everyone and for us together and for all the time his and our world simply **as a thought** [world] is implied, as being seen in such and such a way, being judged in such and such a way, etc. The person itself, the way it <finds> itself or [the way] others find it (grasp, mean, cognize) and could find respectively, is implied, and of course also all the sciences being related to it. Thus the **apriori of a surrounding world** as well and the synthetic apriori of a system of accordance of actual and possible imaginations of the surrounding world of a personality in general – that is the apriori, the invariant, of a conceivable world as world of possible experience and cognition as a system of personal formations belongs into the personal sphere as well, as belonging to its possible surrounding world, but also in another way, as essential form of the idea of its synthetic unity being implied within in infinity possible surrounding worlds of possible personalities (see above).

Thus, if we scientifically bring out at all a personality’s apriori within the attitude of naturalness, in such a way that we posit the personality as being within a presupposed world as such, as occurring within it, then we find **as belonging to the personality itself the world being intentional for it**, in the form of manifold and to be unified surrounding worlds, and we then find here the apriori of the personality. If we started with discerning **the apriori of a possible world pure and simple**, and therein **the apriori of the personality**. If we began by ascertaining the apriori of a possible world pure and simple, and as its piece of content that of a worldly personality, then this part encompassed the whole, namely the apriori of the world occurred within the personality once more.

1. 1927 [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Essential form of a surrounding world. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Here an essential point has been overlooked! Although that which has been said is formally right. That which has been overlooked shows itself to be effective on the following page <=page 677, 28- 678, 20, German edition>. That is, also the world of the primitive men has its harmony, on the other hand, also the European man and even the scientific one may still have a zone of primitivity within his world. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. If we consider the accordance of the primitive men and possibly of <the> idiots, then that which has been said above, becomes wrong or only right within an unsolved and just to be determined core.

   The accordance concerns the world experience; and subjective experiential world or surrounding world is the correlate of this accordance. Obviously accordance is an idea which first of all has to be constructed in a careful way. The accordance of the primitive man is in its sense not an accordance. The identity of the tiger man **Lévy-Bruhls** with the tiger in the woods cannot be experienced. And accordance is the idea of a universal synthesis of all experiences in which all these synthetically combine to the unity of an actual or possible unity of an intersubjective experience. As to the identities then it is according to the continuous identities, those within a single subjective continuous field of perception and of the possible continuous identification within the same in a subjectively temporal change. In this sense the primitive identification of the tiger man with the tiger in the woods is not identifiable by way of a possible perception and intersubjective experience. If I go together with the tiger man into the woods towards the tiger, then I find a duality, not an identical unity. But the “change”? Is the change of a man into some other real thing a possibility of the experience? [↑](#footnote-ref-4)